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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
Ronald Sharrar, Kenneth Sharrar, David Brigden and 
Gerard Sweeney brought this civil rights action pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 against police officers Lt. Albert Wilson, 
Sgt. Michael Larkin, Sgt. William Kennedy, Sgt. Dennis 
Felsing, and the City of Sea Isle, New Jersey, alleging 
unlawful arrest, arrest with excessive force, and two illegal 
searches. After the district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on all claims except for the 
second allegedly illegal search, a magistrate judge 
conducted a jury trial on the remaining claim against Sgts. 
Larkin and Kennedy. The jury found that the search was 
conducted without a warrant but that Sgt. Kennedy had 
not participated in the search and that Sgt. Larkin had a 
reasonable belief that he had a warrant so was entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 
The plaintiffs appeal the summary judgment order, the 
denial of their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and 
the submission of a special interrogatory to the jury with 
respect to Sgt. Kennedy's role in the illegal search. Plaintiffs 
do not appeal dismissal of their claims against the City. 
 
On this appeal, we must consider plaintiffs' contentions 
that the court erred in disposing of certain claims by 
summary judgment and in its handling of the one claim 
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that reached the jury. We must also reach the issue of 
qualified immunity, which had been sought by the 
defendants although not fully addressed by the district 
court. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
Facts 
 
As to those portions of this case that were decided by 
summary judgment, we set forth the undisputed facts as 
revealed by the record, which is comprised almost entirely 
of deposition testimony, and the plaintiffs' version of the 
facts when there are disparities. See In re City of 
Philadelphia Litigation, 49 F.3d 945, 949 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 176 (1995). We also refer to additional 
facts adduced at the trial which was held on the claim 
based on the second search. 
 
On October 1, 1992 at approximately 12:10 p.m. Patricia 
Gannon-Brigden (referred to here as Patricia Gannon) 
called 911 and said "I had somebody come into my 
apartment and beat me up. I'm bleeding pretty bad." App. 
at 152. When the dispatcher asked who beat her up she 
replied "Robert Carroll." The dispatcher asked for 
clarification and Gannon repeated two more times that it 
was Robert Carroll who beat her up. Id. The dispatcher 
asked if he was still there and Gannon replied "No, he left. 
And three other people were here with him. I'm bleeding. I 
have blood all over me. There is blood everywhere." App. at 
152-53. The dispatcher then told Sgt. Felsing, who was in 
the room with the dispatcher, that "There is a woman beat 
up by Robert Carroll." App. at 153. Sgt. Felsing's response 
was inaudible and in deposition he testified that he never 
heard the dispatcher mention the name Robert Carroll. 
 
When Sgt. Felsing arrived at Gannon's apartment she 
told him that she had been hit, and he saw a two-inch 
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laceration on her scalp, a pool of blood on the kitchen floor, 
blood on a pillow in the bedroom and blood in her hair. 
There were no signs of a forced entry or any broken objects 
in the apartment. She told Sgt. Felsing "that her [estranged] 
husband, David Brigden, and three others had come into 
the house, that they held her while David pulled a gun and 
hit her on the side of the head." App. at 250. She said that 
Brigden was being investigated by the FBI for bringing 
drugs into town, and that he told her that he was afraid 
that she had gone to the FBI, and that "she wouldn't be the 
first body he's thrown in the river and they haven't found. 
He hit her and that's the last she remembered." App. at 
255. Gannon did not identify or describe the other three 
men to Sgt. Felsing. 
 
An ambulance arrived soon after, as did Sgt. Larkin and 
Capt. Kevin McClory. Sgt. Larkin stated that "Officer 
Felsing indicated to me that [Gannon's] ex-husband entered 
the condominium while two of her [sic] friends held her 
down, he struck her with a handgun, and there was 
another person involved, that he was standing by the door, 
and he indicated that [Gannon] said that after they left, 
they jumped into the brown van and they went back to 
49th Street." App. at 297. Neither Sgt. Larkin or Capt. 
McClory spoke with Gannon. 
 
Gannon was taken to the hospital and was admitted at 
approximately 1:09 p.m. About the same time, Sgt. Larkin 
dispatched Sgt. Felsing to Brigden's home on 49th Street to 
see whether the van was there. Sgt. Felsing radioed Sgt. 
Larkin to tell him that the van was in front of Brigden's 
residence and then parked his car on another street and 
walked to the northwest corner of 49th Street and waited. 
Sometime thereafter, while Sgt. Felsing was at the property, 
Kim Candle, a resident of one of the units in the building, 
came out and Sgt. Felsing asked her if Brigden was in the 
house. She responded that she had heard noise downstairs 
"so she knew they were there." App. at 263. 
 
Sgt. Larkin also proceeded to Brigden's residence and 
radioed the license number of the van to the dispatcher, 
who confirmed that it was Brigden's van. At approximately 
1:30 p.m. Capt. McClory arrived and Sgt. Larkin suggested 
that they seek reinforcements. Capt. McClory agreed and 
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Sgt. Larkin called the dispatcher and told him to call Lt. 
Wilson, "who was in charge of the tactical unit," and off- 
duty officers. App. at 298. It took approximately a half hour 
to forty-five minutes for all the reinforcement officers to 
arrive. 
 
A "temporary command post" was set up at the 49th 
Street corner where the officers assembled in a variety of 
police vehicles. App. at 345. City of Sea Isle Mayor Michael 
McHale arrived, as did Police Commissioner Libro. FBI 
agent Jack Reemer was called to the scene as a trained 
hostage negotiator. Two officers from the Sheriff 's 
Department arrived. Additional officers from the Avalon and 
Ocean City Police Departments arrived, as did several 
officers with drug/explosives sniffing dogs. Lt. Wilson, the 
officer in charge of the SWAT team, arrived with the entire 
eight member SWAT team, who were dressed in black 
fatigue uniforms and armed with shotguns, rifles and 
submachine guns. App. at 405-06. 
 
The police created an inner and outer perimeter around 
Brigden's residence. Capt. McClory ordered the evacuation 
of all residents in the inner perimeter. He dispatched 
someone to contact the schools in the area to divert their 
normal bus routes and keep at school all children who lived 
in the immediate vicinity of Brigden's residence. App. at 
310. The fire station was ordered to accept evacuees, app. 
at 145; fire trucks and ambulances were told to come to the 
scene without lights and sirens; the City marina was closed 
so that no boats could leave the harbor; and the bridge 
which provided the sole vehicular access to the City was 
blocked. 
 
Once the inner perimeter was cleared, Lt. Wilson 
assigned duties to members of the tactical team. Officer 
Rock, who was "the department sniper," and another officer 
were stationed at a nearby building. App. at 350. Sgt. 
Larkin, Lt. Wilson and at least three other officers were 
assigned to the rear of the residence. Sgt. Kennedy was 
sent to the front of the residence in order to watch the front 
door. Lt. Wilson then told Sgt. Felsing to go to a nearby 
house and call Brigden. Sgt. Felsing was accompanied by 
the FBI hostage negotiator. 
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Sometime between 2:30 and 3:20 in the afternoon, 
Gerard Sweeney, who along with Ronald and Kenneth 
Sharrar was staying with Brigden for a few days, looked out 
a sliding glass door and saw an armed man in black 
fatigues in the backyard. Frightened, he yelled "David, call 
the police." App. at 121. Brigden stated that "I looked out 
the back window and there was a fellow there kneeling, 
dressed in black with a shotgun pointed at the house. And 
I then went to the side window and looked out the side 
window and saw a man there with a machine gun. . . ." 
App. at 129. 
 
When Brigden picked up the phone to call the police, Sgt. 
Felsing was already on the line. Sgt. Felsing identified 
himself, told Brigden that the house was surrounded by 
police, that they had reason to believe he had committed an 
assault, and wanted him to "send his people out" one by 
one backwards out the back door and then for him to come 
out. App. at 262. Brigden stated that while he was on the 
phone he could hear men screaming for them to come out 
backward with their hands on their heads. 
 
The four men complied and walked out backwards one at 
a time into the backyard and were ordered to lie face down 
in the dirt. They allege that the police yelled and 
"threatened to blow our brains out if we made one wrong 
move." App. at 114. Sweeney stated that the police yelled: 
"You move, I will blow your . . . fucking heads off." App. at 
122. Kenneth Sharrar stated that once on the ground the 
police "came up and were yelling, where's the fucking gun. 
Stuck a gun in the back of my head, put their knee in my 
back." App. at 115. Ronald Sharrar claimed the police 
yelled at him to "[k]eep your fucking head down or I'll blow 
it the fuck off," and repeated that threat three to five times. 
App. at 105. 
 By 3:20 p.m. the four men were handcuffed, frisked, and 
taken to the police station. According to Lt. Wilson, once 
the four were taken into custody "[t]he tactical unit 
immediately entered the building and cleared it to make 
sure there were no other suspects still hiding inside." App. 
at 429. 
 
Brigden's residence consisted of a three story single- 
family house that had been converted into four separate 
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locked and numbered apartment units. The first floor 
contained two apartments, one of which was occupied by 
Brigden. There were separate apartments on the second 
and third floors. The officers admitted that they knew that 
the other units were rented to other people. 
 
Lt. Wilson testified that he and the SWAT team cleared 
the building by entering each room in the entire building to 
make sure there were no other suspects. The Mayor of the 
City of Sea Isle also entered the building during this sweep. 
Lt. Wilson then secured the residence so that no one would 
enter the premises again until a search warrant was 
procured. This sweep took somewhere between five and 
twenty minutes. 
 
The precise sequence thereafter is unclear. At Sgt. 
Kennedy's deposition he stated that he and Sgt. Felsing 
then went to obtain a search warrant from Municipal Court 
Judge Kenneth Calloway, that he met with Judge Calloway 
and, before he had anything in writing, told him what had 
occurred and asked for a "no knock search warrant" for the 
premises and all vehicles on the premises. App. at 361-63. 
Sgt. Kennedy then claimed that Judge Calloway gave him 
oral permission to search the premises and told him to 
supply the necessary paperwork later. App. at 364. Sgt. 
Kennedy informed Lt. Wilson that Judge Calloway had 
authorized the search warrant and that the premises could 
be searched. Sgt. Kennedy went back to Brigden's residence 
and conducted a "walk-through of the scene" at the same 
time that Sgt. Larkin, pursuant to Lt. Wilson's direction, 
conducted the search. He was accompanied by several 
other police officers, county sheriffs, and dogs. Sgt. 
Kennedy then returned to the police station where he 
formally transcribed the information he previously had 
given to Judge Calloway and placed it in a search warrant 
application. Judge Calloway signed the search warrant at 
approximately 7:30 p.m., after both the sweep and the 
entire search had been completed. At Judge Calloway's 
deposition, taken shortly after Sgt. Kennedy's deposition, 
Judge Calloway testified that he did not remember"ever 
giving a verbal search warrant or authorization to do 
anything." App. at 530. 
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At the trial, Sgt. Kennedy acknowledged that he had 
testified at his deposition that he had received an oral 
warrant from Judge Calloway, and transmitted that 
information to the officers at the residence. However, he 
stated that his recollection had been refreshed by review of 
the telephonic transmission. App. at 844-45. He testified, or 
at least suggested, that the search was instituted following 
a telephone call during which Lt. Wilson, who was at the 
scene, was advised by Capt. Devlin that he had received a 
telephonic or oral warrant from Judge Calloway. App. at 
832-34, 836, 839-41. 
 
The next day the four plaintiffs were arraigned before 
Judge Calloway and were charged with burglary, assault, 
making terroristic threats and conspiracy. All of the 
charges were eventually dismissed. 
 
B. 
 
Procedural History 
 
In their S 1983 complaint, the four plaintiffs sued Sgt. 
Felsing, Sgt. Kennedy, Sgt. Larkin and Lt. Wilson for 
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for 
arresting them without probable cause, unreasonable 
search and seizure, and use of excessive force. They also 
brought a S 1983 claim against the City of Sea Isle for 
fostering a policy which resulted in the constitutional 
violations by the police force. 
 
After discovery, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary 
judgment. The defendant officers and the City then filed 
their own motion for summary judgment. On March 7, 
1996, the district court entered an order, accompanied by 
an opinion, denying the plaintiffs' motion and granting the 
defendants' motion in part. 
 
The district court held that the police had probable cause 
to arrest, that the arrest occurred in a public place so no 
warrant was required, that the excessive force claim only 
involved an alleged injury to Ronald Sharrar's shoulder 
which could not be attributed to any of the defendants, and 
that the police's initial warrantless search of Bridgen's 
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residence was an acceptable protective sweep. As for the 
second more extensive search, the court referred to it as a 
warrantless search, and did not find any exceptional 
circumstances present to justify conducting a warrantless 
search. Dist. Ct. Op. of March 7, 1996 at 14. It held, 
however, that the only named defendants who were 
implicated in this search were Sgts. Larkin and Kennedy 
and declined to grant summary judgment for plaintiffs as to 
these defendants because there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether they were entitled to qualified 
immunity based on their belief that they had an oral search 
warrant. Finally, the district court granted summary 
judgment for the City, finding that the plaintiffs failed to 
present any evidence of a custom or policy of violating 
constitutional rights. 
 
A magistrate judge presided over the jury trial which was 
held against Sgts. Larkin and Kennedy on the claim 
involving the second search. Following the presentation of 
evidence, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter 
of Law on the issue of qualified immunity, which the 
magistrate judge denied. The magistrate judge then 
submitted the illegal search claim to the jury along with 
special interrogatories. The jury found that the search of 
the premises was unlawful but returned a verdict in favor 
of the defendants, finding that Sgt. Larkin had a good faith 
belief that he was authorized to search the premises and 
that Sgt. Kennedy was not liable because he did not enter 
and search Brigden's residence. 
 
II. 
 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's order 
granting summary judgment, applying the same test as the 
district court should use in the first instance, to determine 
if there are any issues of material fact which would allow 
the issue to go to trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hamilton v. 
Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs, as 
the non-moving parties, are entitled to every favorable 
inference that can be drawn from the record. Id.  
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A. 
 
The Arrests 
 
1. Probable Cause 
 Plaintiffs first argue that there was no probable cause to 
arrest them or at least that it should have been a question 
for the jury. Probable cause is "defined in terms of facts 
and circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was 
committing an offense.' " Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
111 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). 
This standard is meant to " `safeguard citizens from rash 
and unreasonable interferences with privacy' " and to 
provide "leeway for enforcing the law in the community's 
protection." Id. at 112 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
 
We have stated that "[t]he determination that probable 
cause exists for a warrantless arrest is fundamentally a 
factual analysis that must be performed by the officers at 
the scene. It is the function of the court to determine 
whether the objective facts available to the officers at the 
time of arrest were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief 
that an offense [had been] committed." United States v. 
Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1018 (1985). A court must look at the "totality of 
the circumstances" and use a "common sense" approach to 
the issue of probable cause. Id. at 1205 (citing Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). 
 
In a S 1983 action the issue of whether there was 
probable cause to make an arrest is usually a question for 
the jury, but "where no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and where credibility conflicts are absent, 
summary judgment may be appropriate." Deary v. Three 
Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 1984). 
The question is for the jury only if there is sufficient 
evidence whereby a jury could reasonably find that the 
police officers did not have probable cause to arrest. Id. at 
190. 
 
Sgt. Felsing responded almost immediately to Gannon's 
911 call and found her injured and bleeding. She identified 
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her husband David Brigden as her attacker, stated that he 
was assisted by three other men, and also stated that they 
all left in a brown van to return to Brigden's residence. Sgt. 
Felsing then drove to Brigden's residence and saw a brown 
van parked in the driveway that was positively identified by 
the license tag as belonging to Brigden. Because of the 
close proximity to the alleged attack, both in time and 
distance, the police had probable cause to arrest Brigden, 
whom the victim had identified, and the three men who 
were still with Brigden on the reasonable inference that 
they were the same three men who had participated in the 
assault. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that Gannon's initial identification of 
"Robert Carroll" as her assailant was enough to undermine 
her credibility in the eyes of the police and creates a 
genuine issue whether the police had probable cause to 
arrest based on her subsequent identification of Brigden. 
They cite authority which they claim required the police to 
assess her reliability. 
 
The cases on which plaintiffs rely involve informers, not 
victims. "[T]he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually 
found in cases involving informants, sometimes 
anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is appropriately 
relaxed if the informant is an identified victim. . . ." Easton 
v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). The district court 
explained, and we agree, that "[t]he cloistered nature of 
domestic violence is such that the testimony of the battered 
spouse and the injury itself may be the only evidence 
available to establish probable cause." Dist. Ct. Op. at 8. 
 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Sgt. Felsing heard 
Gannon's initial claim that Robert Carroll attacked her. 
Even if he had heard, it was reasonable for Sgt. Felsing to 
assess Gannon's demeanor, find her story credible, and rely 
on her subsequent identification of her husband as the 
attacker. When a police officer has received a reliable 
identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police 
have probable cause to arrest. See Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 
942 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991) ("It is surely reasonable 
for a police officer to base his belief in probable cause on a 
victim's reliable identification of his attacker."); Grimm v. 
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Churchill, 932 F.2d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 1991) ("When an 
officer has received his information from some person-- 
normally the putative victim or an eye witness--who it 
seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth, he has 
probable cause." (internal quotations omitted)). 
 
Ronald Sharrar, Kenneth Sharrar and Gerard Sweeney 
argue that even if there was probable cause to arrest David 
Brigden based on Gannon's identification, there was not 
sufficient evidence to arrest them. They cite the Supreme 
Court decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979), 
for the proposition that "mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, 
without more, give rise to probable cause. . . ." In Ybarra, 
a search warrant was issued to search a bar on the 
suspicion that a bartender was involved in drug sales. The 
police arrived and frisked all patrons based solely on their 
presence at the public tavern. Ybarra, a patron, sought to 
exclude evidence which was recovered from his person 
during this search. The Supreme Court held that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the police 
had no facts which would support a suspicion that Ybarra 
had violated the law or that he was armed and presently 
dangerous. See id. at 91-93. 
 
Ybarra is inapposite. This is not a case where Ronald 
Sharrar, Kenneth Sharrar and Gerard Sweeney were 
arrested based on their "mere propinquity" to Brigden. 
Rather, they were arrested based upon an assault victim's 
description of her attack, which included a clear 
identification of her husband and the statement that he 
was accompanied by three other men who all left in a 
brown van to go to Brigden's house. In less than an hour 
from the time of the 911 call, Sgt. Felsing observed that van 
outside of Brigden's house and learned from another 
resident of the building that Brigden may not be alone. 
These facts support a finding of probable cause to arrest all 
four plaintiffs. 
 
2. Warrantless Arrest 
 
Plaintiffs next contend that their arrests were illegal, even 
if probable cause existed, because the arrests occurred 
within their home unaccompanied by a warrant. Although 
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police may make a warrantless arrest in a public place if 
they have probable cause to believe the suspect is a felon, 
"the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the 
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that 
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a 
warrant." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). 
 
The district court found that the arrests occurred in a 
public place so no warrant was required: "[T]he police 
telephoned the plaintiffs at home and asked them to come 
out. They consented to do so and were arrested outside, in 
a public place, at the moment the police took physical 
custody of them." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. Thus, notwithstanding 
that the court recognized that "a substantial amount of 
coercion motivated plaintiffs' consent," id., the court found 
there to be no jury issue. 
 
The point at which an arrest occurs has been the subject 
of considerable judicial line-drawing. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968), the Supreme Court defined a 
seizure as "when the officer, by means of physical force or 
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of 
a citizen. . . ." Later, in I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 
(1984), the Court explained that a person has been seized 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "if, in view of 
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free 
to leave." (internal quotations omitted). In the most recent 
decision on the issue, the Supreme Court in California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) explained that "[a]n 
arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is 
absent, submission to the assertion of authority." (emphasis 
in original). 
 
Under any of these tests, when a SWAT team surrounds 
a residence with machine guns pointed at the windows and 
the persons inside are ordered to leave the house 
backwards with their hands raised, an arrest has 
undoubtably occurred. There was a clear show of physical 
force and assertion of authority. No reasonable person 
would have believed that he was free to remain in the 
house. We hold that under these circumstances the arrests 
occurred inside Brigden's home. See United States v. Al- 
Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (arrest occurred 
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in the home when police surrounded the residence and 
ordered the person out with a bullhorn), cert. denied, 476 
U.S. 1144 (1986); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 
1450 (10th Cir. 1989) (where SWAT team surrounded 
trailer with rifles pointed and ordered suspect to exit, arrest 
occurred in home despite lack of physical entry). Therefore, 
the police were required to have secured an arrest warrant 
unless there were exigent circumstances. See Payton, 445 
U.S. at 590. 
 
The district court held that even if the arrests occurred 
indoors, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
arrests. The government bears the burden of proving that 
exigent circumstances existed: "Before agents of the 
government may invade the sanctity of the home, the 
burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent 
circumstances that overcome the presumption of 
unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home 
entries." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 
 
In explicating further on the type of exigent 
circumstances that would justify a warrantless entry into a 
person's home, the Court quoted the Minnesota Supreme 
Court with approval where it stated: "a warrantless 
intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of afleeing felon, 
or imminent destruction of evidence, . . . or the need to 
prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the 
police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling." 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (internal 
quotations omitted); see United States v. Velasquez, 626 
F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
There is an insufficient basis on this record to hold, as 
the district court did, that exigent circumstances existed as 
a matter of law. There is nothing in the record to support 
a theory of "hot pursuit," a fear that the suspects would 
flee, or a fear that evidence would be destroyed. It appears 
that, at most, the police believed that the suspects posed a 
danger because Gannon said she had been hit with a gun. 
The mere possession of a gun, which as far as the officers 
knew had been used only once and then against Brigden's 
wife, no matter how grievous a crime, does not necessarily 
show exigent circumstances. The police have not 
satisfactorily explained why, when the house was 
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completely surrounded by an armed SWAT team, they 
could not secure the premises while they went to procure 
an arrest warrant, especially in light of the fact that 
Municipal Court Judge Calloway was sitting on the bench 
at the police station during this entire episode. 
 
The issue of exigent circumstances in these 
circumstances would be one for the jury. See, e.g., Bodine 
v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 1995) (issue of 
whether exigent circumstances existed should go to jury 
when there are disputed factual issues). However, there is, 
at most, evidence that only two of the defendants were 
involved in the arrest. Sgt. Felsing may be viewed by a fact 
finder as having effected the arrest by telephoning the order 
to exit to the plaintiffs, and he apparently did so under the 
direction of Lt. Wilson, the officer in charge of the 
operation. Thus, in summary, we cannot affirm the district 
court's disposition of the plaintiffs' claims based on that 
court's view that the arrests raised no constitutional issue. 
 
B. 
 
Excessive Force 
 
We turn next to plaintiffs' contention that the district 
court erred in holding that there was insufficient evidence 
to present a jury issue on their claim that excessive force 
was used to arrest them. When an "excessive force claim 
arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a 
free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one 
invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which 
guarantees citizens the right `to be secure in their persons 
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures' of the person." 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The proper 
test for evaluating an excessive force claim is therefore one 
of objective reasonableness. See id. at 397. 
 
This objective reasonableness test "requires careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396. See also 
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Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d 
Cir. 1995). Significantly, the Supreme Court has cautioned 
that in applying the objective reasonableness test, "[n]ot 
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary 
in the peace of a judge's chambers," is constitutionally 
unreasonable. 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotations 
omitted). Rather, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must 
embody allowance for the fact that `police officers are often 
forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.' " Id. at 396-97. 
 
In granting summary judgment, the district court held 
that only Ronald Sharrar alleged any physical injury and 
that that injury could not be attributed to any of the 
defendant officers. On appeal the plaintiffs argue that Lt. 
Wilson, as the on-scene commander and SWAT team 
leader, may be held liable for acquiescing in the 
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinate officers, even if 
he was not directly responsible for Ronald Sharrar's 
injuries. Plaintiffs also argue that their excessive force 
claim involves not just Sharrar's physical injury, but the 
entire level of force and verbal abuse used in the arresting 
process: deploying the SWAT team, forcing plaintiffs to lie 
face down in the dirt, and threatening that if they moved 
the police would "blow [their] . . . fucking heads off." App. 
at 122. 
 
Ronald Sharrar, the only plaintiff who alleged any 
physical injury, stated in deposition that the injury to his 
shoulder occurred after he was placed in the police car: "My 
handcuffs were grabbed from behind and my arms were 
lifted up from behind. . . .My shoulder came partially out of 
the socket." App. at 105-06. The claims of the other 
plaintiffs are limited to "emotional distress, humiliation" 
and "public scorn and derision." Complaint, App. at 30. 
 
Ronald Sharrar, who could recognize all of the defendant 
officers, was unable to identify which police officers were in 
the police car with him at the time of the alleged abuse. 
There was therefore no evidentiary basis on which to hold 
these defendants liable. Plaintiffs argue that Lt. Wilson may 
be liable under the cases holding that a police officer may 
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be liable for violating an arrestee's rights not only if he 
personally participates in the violation, but also if he 
directs others to so violate, or had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in his subordinates' violations. See Baker v. 
Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995). 
However, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that 
Lt. Wilson, as the officer in charge, had any knowledge of 
the alleged incident in the police car. Therefore, we will not 
disturb the district court's determination that the conduct 
leading to Ronald Sharrar's injury could not be attributed 
to Wilson. 
 
Turning next to the extent of force employed in effecting 
the four arrests, it is incontestable that the display of force 
used to apprehend the four men for an alleged domestic 
assault, albeit with a gun, appears extreme. It entailed 
calling over twenty officers to the scene, including a SWAT 
team armed with machine guns and an FBI hostage 
negotiator. It does not follow, however, that the extreme 
methods used in effecting the arrests, such as requiring 
plaintiffs to lie face down in the dirt, with guns to their 
heads and vulgar threats, were constitutionally excessive, 
even though they caused plaintiffs' discomfort and 
humiliation. Although there are decisions of this court that 
have found the use of force excessive, notwithstanding the 
absence of extensive physical contact and permanent 
physical injury, the circumstances here are distinguishable. 
 
In Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982), we sustained a jury verdict 
in a case where a plain-clothed police officer brandished 
and pointed a revolver at plaintiff and his wife during what 
was at that time only an investigatory stop. However, in 
that case there had been no basis for plaintiff to know that 
the gunman was a police officer or that an arrest would 
eventually be effected. And in Baker v. Monroe, 50 F.3d at 
1193, where police officers ordered those approaching a 
house that was the subject of an incipient drug raid to "get 
down," pushing them to the ground, while using handguns, 
we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment 
and suggested that the officers' actions could constitute a 
constitutional violation. See also McDonald v. Haskins, 966 
F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding a violation of the 
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Fourth Amendment when a police officer aimed a gun at a 
passive nine-year-old boy and threatened to pull the 
trigger). 
 
The Supreme Court made clear in Graham that each case 
alleging excessive force must be evaluated under the 
totality of the circumstances. The district court here 
focused only on the presence vel non of physical injury. We 
do not agree that the absence of physical injury necessarily 
signifies that the force has not been excessive, although the 
fact that the physical force applied was of such an extent 
as to lead to injury is indeed a relevant factor to be 
considered as part of the totality. See Gumz v. Morrissette, 
772 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that, 
under substantive due process standard, excessive force 
claim must be "so egregious as to be constitutionally 
excessive, and the presence of some physical injury is 
certainly relevant to that determination"), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled, Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 
F.2d 706, 712-14 (7th Cir. 1987). Other relevant factors 
include the possibility that the persons subject to the police 
action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of 
the action, whether the action takes place in the context of 
effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be 
armed, and the number of persons with whom the police 
officers must contend at one time. 
 
In this case, the officers were arresting four men, they 
had been advised that at least one of the men, with the 
assistance of others, had used a gun in a violent episode 
which was still unaccounted for, there had been some 
suggestion that they may have been involved with drugs, 
and there is no allegation that the requirement that the 
suspects lie down extended beyond the time necessary to 
handcuff them and secure them. While the language and 
method used to effect the arrests appear to be more akin to 
the Rambo-type behavior associated with police in 
overdramatized B movies or TV shows than the police 
conduct ordinarily expected in a quiet, family seaside town, 
we are reluctant to establish a precedent that would subject 
every police arrest of a group of possible violent offenders to 
compliance with Marquis of Queensberry Rules of fair play. 
Although these police officers came close to the line, these 
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circumstances, in totality, do not rise to a Fourth 
Amendment violation. Therefore, we will not hold erroneous 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the police 
officers on the plaintiffs' claim of excessive force. 
 
C. 
 
The Searches 
 
1. The "Protective Sweep" 
 
The plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred 
when it held constitutionally permissible the "protective 
sweep" of the premises conducted by the defendants after 
plaintiffs were arrested but before defendants procured a 
search warrant. The Supreme Court has defined a 
protective sweep as "a quick and limited search of 
premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect 
the safety of police officers or others." Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). The sweep must be limited to a 
search of "closets and other spaces immediately adjoining 
the place of arrest from which an attack could be 
immediately launched." Id. at 334. If the search goes 
beyond the immediately adjoining areas, there must be 
"articulable facts" which would warrant a reasonably 
prudent officer to believe that there are individuals who 
pose a danger in other areas of the house. See id. at 334. 
 
In this case, the officers sought to justify their 
warrantless entry into Brigden's unit immediately following 
effecting the arrest by telephone on the ground that it was 
a quick protective sweep incident to the arrest and needed 
to protect the safety of the officers involved. The officers 
contend they entered the residence seeking to determine 
that there were no other accomplices hiding in the building 
with access to the gun that remained unaccounted for. 
Although they swept more broadly than Brigden's unit, we 
need not decide whether the sweep of the remainder of the 
four-unit building was justified because these plaintiffs, 
who were overnight guests of Brigden, only had a privacy 
interest in Brigden's unit and lack standing to challenge a 
search of other persons' apartments. Olson, 495 U.S. at 95 
(Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches 
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only those places where persons have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy). 
 
We note as an initial matter that we are not dealing with 
a criminal case where the admissibility of evidence found 
during a protective sweep following an unconstitutional 
arrest would lead to suppression of the evidence as fruits of 
the unconstitutional arrests. Under the jurisprudence of 
this court, the validity of the search for purposes of a 
S 1983 suit must be examined independently of the 
lawfulness of the arrests. See generally, Bodine, 72 F.3d at 
400 (in a S 1983 case, questions of reasonableness and 
constitutionality of officers' conduct once inside the home 
were not dependent on whether officers' entry into the 
home was lawful since officers are liable in tort only for 
injury proximately caused by their unreasonable conduct). 
 
In Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court's seminal 
decision on this issue, the Court explained why a protective 
sweep "incident to [an] arrest" was permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment notwithstanding it was "without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion." 494 U.S. at 334. 
The Court explained: 
 
       In the instant case, there is an . . . interest of the 
       officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the 
       house in which the suspect is being, or has just been, 
       arrested is not harboring other persons who are 
       dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an 
       attack. The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in 
       the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an 
       on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter. .. . 
       A protective sweep . . . occurs as an adjunct to the 
       serious step of taking a person into custody for the 
       purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Moreover, 
       unlike an encounter on the street or along a highway, 
       an in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of 
       being on his adversary's "turf." An ambush in a 
       confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be 
       feared than it is in open, more familiar surrounding. 
 
Id. at 333 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted 
that 
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       the arrest warrant gave the police every right to enter 
       the home to search for Buie. Once inside, the potential 
       for danger justified a standard of less than probable 
       cause for conducting a limited protective sweep. 
 
Id. at 334 n.1 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court 
cautioned that, unlike an evidentiary search, "a protective 
sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified 
by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of 
the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection 
of those spaces where a person may be found." Id. at 335. 
 
Although this court has never ruled on the circumstances 
in which a protective sweep of a home, as defined in Buie, 
would be permissible as incident to an arrest occurring just 
outside the home, those circuits that have addressed the 
issue have uniformly held that the reasoning of Buie is also 
applicable and that under those circumstances, protective 
sweeps of the home in such situations are not per se 
unreasonable, see, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 
773, 776-77 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Henry, 48 
F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Kimmons, 965 F.2d 1001, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993), cert. granted and judgment 
vacated on other grounds, Small v. United States, 508 U.S. 
902 (1993), judgment reinstated, United States v. Kimmons, 
1 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Oguns, 921 
F.2d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Tisdale, 921 
F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
986 (1991). Those courts also agree that a sweep incident 
to an arrest occurring just outside the home must be 
analyzed under the second prong of the Buie analysis 
requiring "articulable facts which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be 
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on 
the arrest scene." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. 
 
Like our sister circuits, we see no reason to impose a 
bright line rule limiting protective sweeps to in-home 
arrests, as we agree with the Colbert court that "in some 
circumstances, an arrest taking place just outside a home 
may pose an equally serious threat to the arresting 
officers." 76 F.3d at 776. Certainly, it would be imprudent 
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to prohibit officers who are effecting an arrest or waiting 
until a warrant may be obtained from ensuring their safety 
and minimizing the risk of gunfire or other attack coming 
from inside the home if they have reason to believe that 
dangerous individuals are inside. Therefore, in order to 
determine whether the protective sweep in question met the 
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buie, we 
must consider whether there was an articulable basis for a 
protective sweep, i.e., a warrantless search, under the 
circumstances at that time. 
 
Predictably, where the courts have differed in permitting 
protective sweeps incident to arrests outside the home is on 
the quantity and quality of the articulable facts necessary 
to justify the sweep, rather than on the underlying 
standard. In Oguns, 921 F.2d at 446-47, for example, the 
Second Circuit upheld a protective sweep following an 
arrest outside the home where "[e]ven though the agents 
had been told that Oguns' brother was not in the 
apartment, they still could have reasonably believed that 
others were in the apartment." Similarly in Tisdale, 921 
F.2d at 1097, the Tenth Circuit upheld a protective sweep 
following an arrest made outside the home, reasoning that 
"the fact that defendant fled [from the trailer before being 
arrested], along with the sounds of gunshots, was ample 
justification for a protective sweep." In Colbert, 76 F.3d at 
777-78, however, the Sixth Circuit invalidated a protective 
sweep following an arrest made outside the home and after 
the arrestee's girlfriend frantically ran out of the house to 
the arrest site because the officers had no information as to 
whether anyone else was still in the house following the 
arrest. In so holding, the court reasoned that " `[n]o 
information' cannot be an articulable basis for a sweep that 
requires information to justify it in the first place". Id. at 
778. 
 
Although the parties before us have not focused on Buie 
and the standard enunciated there, the officers do contend 
that the protective sweep was justified in light of the 
"legitimate fear for their safety given the totality of the 
circumstances they faced." Appellee's Brief at 24. 
Admittedly, if the officers had an articulable basis to believe 
that a confederate of those apprehended was still at large or 
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within the premises and that a weapon previously sighted 
and not yet recovered might be available within the 
premises, the protective sweep could have been justified, 
see, e.g., Kimmons, 965 F.2d at 1009-10. The reasonable 
possibility that an associate of the arrestees remains at 
large to do mischief or cause danger to the officers is the 
salient, although not necessarily only, concern for which a 
warrantless protective sweep is justified. The evidence from 
these defendants themselves, however, negates reliance on 
these possibilities as the articulable basis for the protective 
sweep. 
 
The transcript of the events as they were unfolding 
contains the following dialogue: 
 
        MR. DEVLIN: Somebody from the Prosecutor's 
       Office talked to the wife, there's only one gun involved, 
       it's a pistol in the brown van in front of the house. 
 
        MR. McCLORY: 10-4. Keep them coming out the 
       back. 
         MR. WILSON: Brigden is not out yet, he should be 
       the fourth individual inside. 
 
        MR. FELSING: Felsing to L-8. 
 
        MR. McCLORY: If there's any movement to that 
       brown van, let us know. 
 
        MR. KENNEDY: I'm right on top of it, I am only 20 
       feet away from it. 
 
        Let's go back to the back, once they are out, we'll get 
       the gun. 
 
        MR. FELSING: Felsing to L-8. 
 
        MR. WILSON: You got this fourth guy on the phone, 
       Dennis? 
 
        MR. FELSING: Got him on the phone. 
 
        MR. WILSON: Send him out. 
 
        MR. FELSING: 10-4. 
 
        Okay he's coming out. 
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        MR. McCLORY: C-2 to L-8, I think everybody is 
       clear. 
 
        MR. KENNEDY: The one in the front was covered. 
 
        MR. WILSON: Tommy, you got the front door? 
 
        MR. ROCK: Negative. 
 
        MR. WILSON: Stand by. 
 
        Dennis, is everybody out? 
 
        MR. FELSING: Confirmed. 
 
        MR. WILSON: We're ready for transport whenever 
       you are ready. 
 
App. at 1075-76 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, under the circumstances, the fact that the officers 
believed that Brigden had brandished a pistol cannot, on its 
own, constitute sufficient "articulable facts" as required 
under Buie for two reasons. First, it implies nothing 
regarding the possible presence of anyone being in 
Brigden's home -- the touchstone of the protective sweep 
analysis. See Colbert, 76 F.3d at 777 (arrestee's 
dangerousness is irrelevant to the protective sweep analysis 
once the arrestee is in custody); United States v. Ford, 56 
F.3d 265, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (fact that homicide suspect 
was assumed to be armed and dangerous did not justify 
protective sweep beyond the immediate area of the arrest). 
Second and more importantly, at the time of the protective 
sweep, the officers at the scene had been informed, and 
believed, that the gun allegedly used in the assault was not 
in Brigden's residence, but in his van. App. at 1075-79. 
 
Similarly unavailing to the officers is the fact that they 
had been told that Brigden was accompanied by three 
accomplices. Once all four men were out of the house and 
in custody, the arresting officers had no basis, let alone the 
"articulable facts" required under Buie, to conclude that 
others remained inside. Indeed, as the transcript reveals, 
Sgt. Felsing informed Lt. Wilson that everyone was out of 
the house before the sweep was initiated. App. at 1076. 
 
Because we agree with the court in Colbert that " `[n]o 
information' cannot be an articulable basis for a sweep that 
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requires information to justify it in the first place," 76 F.3d 
at 778, we conclude that the Buie "articulable facts" 
standard was not met in this case, and we cannot sustain 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
defendants as to the protective sweep. 
 
2. The Subsequent Search 
 
Plaintiffs next challenge the court's disposition of their 
claims that the subsequent full search of the building, also 
conducted before a written search warrant was issued, was 
unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argue that the district court 
erred when it found that only Sgts. Kennedy and Larkin 
were implicated in the search, and granted summary 
judgment to Sgt. Felsing and Lt. Wilson on the ground that 
"they played no part in the search." Dist. Ct. Op. at 17. 
 
Sgt. Kennedy testified in his deposition that it was Lt. 
Wilson who ordered Sgt. Larkin to conduct the search. Lt. 
Wilson stated in his own deposition that he was in the 
house during the time the search was being conducted, 
although he claimed that he did not personally search the 
premises. See App. at 439. Lt. Wilson was the highest 
ranking officer at the scene and a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the search was conducted under his 
direction. It was therefore improper to grant summary 
judgment in favor of Lt. Wilson. 
 
However, the only evidence linking Sgt. Felsing to the 
search was that he, along with Sgt. Kennedy, provided the 
initial information orally to Municipal Court Judge Calloway 
in order to procure a search warrant. Nothing suggests that 
Sgt. Felsing knew that a telephonic or "verbal" warrant, 
rather than a written warrant, was being procured and 
there is no evidence that he played any part in the decision 
to rely on that "verbal" warrant to conduct or authorize the 
search. Inasmuch as Sgt. Felsing did not participate in the 
search itself, it was not error to grant summary judgment 
as to him. 
 
To summarize, we conclude that the district court erred 
in holding that there were exigent circumstances as a 
matter of law to justify the warrantless arrests, that the 
protective sweep was justified as a matter of law 
notwithstanding the absence of articulable facts and that 
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there was no basis to hold Lt. Wilson responsible for the 
subsequent search. 
 
III. 
 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
 
A. 
 
Applicable Principles 
 
A claim under section 1983 for damages against police 
officers or other government officials will almost inevitably 
raise issues as to the availability of qualified immunity. 
Government officials performing discretionary functions are 
"shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). In addition, and particularly in S 1983 cases 
involving alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the inquiry is whether 
a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her 
conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly established law 
and the information in the officer's possession. See Hunter 
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam); Anderson 
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Our cases have 
followed that lead. See Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 
392, 395-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 
707, 712 (3d Cir. 1996); Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 
71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Thus, law enforcement officials who "reasonably but 
mistakenly" conclude that their conduct comports with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are entitled to 
immunity. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227. See also Anderson, 483 
U.S. at 641; Kornegay, No. 96-7423, slip op. at 5; Orsatti, 
71 F.3d at 483. In this way, "the qualified immunity 
standard `gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by 
protecting `all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.' " Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 
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(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986)); 
Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484. It follows that the officer's 
subjective beliefs about the legality of his or her conduct 
generally "are irrelevant." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. See 
also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 123-24 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
The first issue, whether the plaintiff alleges the violation 
of a clearly established constitutional right, is purely a 
question of law, and the Supreme Court has made clear 
that this is a threshold question that should be decided 
expeditiously to spare a defendant the "unwarranted 
demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long 
drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 
(1991). 
 
The language in our cases is much less clear as to 
whether the second issue, the reasonableness of the 
official's mistaken belief in the lawfulness of his or her 
conduct, presents an issue of law for the court or an issue 
of fact for the jury. We have recently noted the "tension . . . 
as to the proper role of the judge and jury where qualified 
immunity is asserted." Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 
401 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Grant, 98 F.3d at 122). To 
some extent that tension may be attributable to our effort 
to comply with the Supreme Court's instruction that 
qualified immunity defenses be resolved at the earliest 
possible point in the litigation while recognizing the 
difficulty in applying that instruction in situations where 
there are disputes of relevant fact. See Grant, 98 F.3d at 
122. 
 
We are informed by the Supreme Court's discussion of 
this issue in Hunter, 502 U.S. 224, a case that surprisingly 
appears not to have been cited in any of this court's 
reported opinions. Bryant, who was arrested by Secret 
Service agents without a warrant for making threats 
against the President, sued them for damages after the 
criminal complaint against him was dismissed. The officers 
moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds, alleging, inter alia, that they believed that they 
had probable cause to make the arrest based on Bryant's 
possession and delivery of a letter indicating that a "Mr. 
Image" would assassinate President Reagan on the 
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President's upcoming trip to Germany, on tips that Bryant 
had earlier that day talked of assassination generally and 
told a co-worker that the President should have been 
assassinated in Bonn, and on Bryant's refusal to answer 
the agents' questions regarding his intent to harm the 
President. Id. at 224-26. The denial of that motion by the 
district court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which 
stated that "[w]hether a reasonable officer could have 
believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of 
fact, and summary judgment . . . based on lack of probable 
cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable 
conclusion a jury could reach." Id. at 228. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: 
 
       [t]his statement of law is wrong for two reasons. First, 
       it routinely places the question of immunity in the 
       hands of the jury. Immunity ordinarily should be 
       decided by the court long before trial. Second, the court 
       should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under 
       settled law in the circumstances, not whether another 
       reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the 
       events can be constructed five years after the fact. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The Court 
then remanded the case for further proceedings. 
 
A review of our opinions in the last three or four years 
discloses that we have not always followed what appears to 
be the Supreme Court's instruction that the reasonableness 
of an official's belief that his or her conduct is lawful is a 
question of law for the court, although other courts have 
interpreted the opinion in that way. See, e.g., Pierce v. 
Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Hunter for 
the proposition that "whether under the circumstances a 
reasonable officer could believe probable cause for arrest 
existed, thus giving rise to qualified immunity, is a question 
of law"). 
 
Some of our cases have followed this approach, even 
without citation to Hunter. In Parkhurst, for example, police 
officers were sued in a S 1983 action based on the claim 
that the warrantless search of plaintiff's home violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 77 F.3d at 710. In reversing the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified 
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immunity grounds, we stated that "[t]o determine 
reasonableness [of the search], a reviewing court must ask 
`whether a reasonable person could have believed the 
defendant's actions to be lawful in light of clearly 
established law and the information he possessed.' " Id. at 
712 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). We then applied 
this standard and held that as a matter of law the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment, and "the police officers 
reasonably should have known that their conduct was 
unlawful." Id. at 713. 
 
We again applied this approach in our recent decision in 
Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 1997), where 
plaintiff filed suit under S 1983 alleging that he had been 
arrested with neither a warrant nor probable cause. The 
district court granted the defendant officers summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. On appeal, we 
held that no probable cause existed and turned to the issue 
of qualified immunity, stating that "[w]hether a 
governmental official is entitled to protection under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity is a `purely legal question.' " 
Id. at 454 (citing Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (en banc)). 
 
The qualified immunity issue in Rogers raised the 
question whether defendant officers' reliance on the 
statements of other officers was reasonable. On the issue 
relevant here, the respective roles of the judge and the jury, 
we stated that "where a police officer makes an arrest on 
the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will 
be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil 
rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was objectively 
reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the statements, 
that probable cause for the arrest existed." Id. at 455 
(emphasis added). This court then examined the 
information possessed by each defendant and determined 
whether his belief that a warrant or probable cause existed 
was reasonable. Id. at 455-57. Significantly, we made those 
reasonableness determinations as a matter of law. Id.See 
also Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 104-06 (3d Cir. 
1989) (stating that official's objective good faith is purely 
legal question and holding it reasonable for officer to rely 
on a facially valid written bulletin indicating that a warrant 
existed). 
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We do not suggest that there may never be instances 
where resort to a jury is appropriate in deciding the 
qualified immunity issue. For example, in Karnes v. 
Skurtski, 62 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 1995), we reversed the 
district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the 
issue of qualified immunity. Plaintiff had alleged that 
defendant police officers unlawfully searched his vehicle 
following an investigatory stop. We held that because there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
officers in fact believed that certain "vegetable matter" seen 
on the floor of the car was or likely could have been 
marijuana, the issue of the officers' right to qualified 
immunity was an issue of fact for the jury. We did not 
reach the issue whether, had there been no factual dispute 
about the officers' actual belief, the jury rather than the 
court would have had to decide the question of the 
reasonableness of their belief. Accord, Lampkin v. City of 
Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1993) ("It must be 
recognized that even though [Hunter v.] Bryant diminished 
the jury's role in qualified immunity cases, it did not 
entirely abolish it. Rule 56 still has vitality in qualified 
immunity cases if [there are] underlying historical facts in 
dispute that are material to the resolution of the questions 
whether the defendants acted in an objectively reasonable 
manner in view of the existing law and facts available to 
them." (internal citations omitted)), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1019 (1994). 
 
We thus hold, following the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hunter, that in deciding whether defendant officers are 
entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of 
"clearly established law" that is for the court but also 
whether the actions of the officers were objectively 
reasonable. Only if the historical facts material to the latter 
issue are in dispute, as in Karnes, will there be an issue for 
the jury. The reasonableness of the officers' beliefs or 
actions is not a jury question, as the Supreme Court 
explained in Hunter. 
 
                                30 
 
 
 
B. 
 
Application of Qualified Immunity 
 
1. The Protective Sweep 
 
As discussed in part II.C.1. above, the protective sweep of 
Brigden's home was unlawful because the officers at the 
scene did not possess "articulable facts" justifying a 
reasonable belief that dangerous individuals remained 
inside the home after the arrests. To prevail on their 
qualified immunity claim, -- a claim not reached by the 
district court -- defendants must show that their conduct 
did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of 
which a reasonable officer would have been aware. Because 
the resolution of that issue is purely a question of law, 
there is no reason why this court should not address it 
now. 
 
The Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to 
apply its holding in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), 
to protective sweeps incident to arrests made just outside 
the home. And prior to today, we have never had occasion 
to apply the Court's reasoning in that case in a published 
opinion. Thus, on October 1, 1992, the date of the 
protective sweep, defendants had no express guidance as to 
the lawfulness of their conduct from any directly controlling 
authority. Moreover, at that time, two courts of appeals had 
upheld protective sweeps incident to arrests made outside 
the home under the Buie rationale by officers who had little 
more in the way of articulable facts than did the defendants 
in this case. See United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d at 446- 
47; United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1097. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the law as to protective sweeps 
incident to arrests made outside the home was not clearly 
established, and even though the protective sweep 
conducted by the defendant officers exceeded constitutional 
boundaries, defendants were protected by qualified 
immunity. 
 
2. Exigent Circumstances 
 
In contrast to the issue of liability for the protective 
sweep, the defendants' claim that they should be afforded 
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qualified immunity for the arrests, even if there were no 
exigent circumstances, cannot be disposed of by this court 
based on the absence of "clearly established law." The law 
on exigent circumstances was fully developed at the time of 
the incidents at issue, and a reasonable police officer 
should have known the applicable law. We note, however, 
that the Hunter Court framed the inquiry to be asked by 
the court as to "whether the agents acted reasonably under 
settled law in the circumstances." 502 U.S. at 228. From 
our vantage point, we see no "circumstances" that would 
affect application of the clearly established law, but are 
cognizant that this issue was not addressed by the district 
court. We are unwilling to pretermit argument by the 
parties that may be relevant to the district court's 
determination which, as we previously stated, is essentially 
one of law. Nor is it clear that there are no disputes as to 
the historical facts. If there are and if they would be 
material to the determination, then the resolution of those 
disputes would be for the jury. In sum, we are not in a 
position to resolve the possibility of qualified immunity at 
this time and will remand that issue to the district court. 
 
3. The Second Search 
 
It is also clearly established law under the Fourth 
Amendment that "searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. Such warrantless searches are 
prohibited "absent probable cause and exigent 
circumstances." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749. In the case at bar, 
the district court held that no exigent circumstances 
justified a warrantless search, and that issue is not before 
us. 
 
With respect to the existence of clearly established law, 
the parties have focused on whether defendants complied 
with New Jersey's law applicable to the issuance of 
warrants. Although the primary issue is whether the search 
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, that 
question cannot be answered without reference to state law. 
In Acierno, 40 F.3d at 620, this court looked to state law to 
determine whether certain rights were "clearly established." 
And in the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Scherer, 
468 U.S. 183, 193 n.11 (1984), the Court suggested that 
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state law may be relevant to the immunity analysis where 
that law bears directly upon the federal claim, such as 
where a plaintiff 's property rights are defined by state law 
for purposes of a due process challenge. Here, similar to 
claims for the deprivation of property without due process, 
the validity of the search under federal law depends in part 
on the validity of the warrant under state law. Thus, the 
officers' knowledge of the state warrant law bears directly 
upon the reasonableness, under the Fourth Amendment, of 
executing the search with an invalid warrant. 
 
Under New Jersey Court Rule 3:5-3 (1992), search 
warrants may be issued either orally or in writing after 
complying with various procedural safeguards. Written 
warrants may be issued when an applicant appears in 
person before a judge providing his or her affidavit or 
testimony and the judge finds that there are grounds for 
issuing the warrant. The judge shall then "date and issue 
the warrant identifying the property to be seized, naming or 
describing the person or place to be searched and 
specifying the hours when it may be executed." N.J. Ct. R. 
3:5-3(a). 
 
A telephonic warrant, on the other hand, may be issued 
when the applicant is not physically present. The Rule, 
however, sets forth a variety of heightened procedural 
safeguards for the issuance of a telephonic warrant so that 
"the integrity and soundness [of the issuing judge's] 
determinations can be assured." New Jersey v. Valencia, 93 
N.J. 126, 138, 459 A.2d 1149, 1155 (1983). Only a 
Superior Court Judge, not a Municipal Court Judge like 
Judge Calloway, is authorized to issue telephonic warrants. 
The Rule further provides, inter alia, that the Superior 
Court Judge must "contemporaneously record" the sworn 
oral testimony of the person(s) providing information to 
procure the warrant and satisfy him or herself that"exigent 
circumstances exist sufficient to excuse the failure to 
obtain a written warrant, and that sufficient grounds for 
granting the application have been shown." N.J. Ct. R. 3:5- 
3(b). Once the judge approves the warrant, the judge is 
required to "memorialize the specific terms of the 
authorization to search and shall direct the applicant to 
enter this authorization verbatim on a form, or other 
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appropriate paper, designated the duplicate original search 
warrant. This warrant shall be deemed a search warrant for 
the purpose of [this Rule]." Id. 
 
The judge must also "contemporaneously record factual 
determinations as to exigent circumstances," certify a 
transcription of the testimony, and "shall promptly issue a 
written confirmatory search warrant and shall enter 
thereon the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original 
warrant." Id. By requiring strict adherence to these exacting 
requirements, the Rule comports with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's insistence on "a reliable underpinning to 
the judicial decision authorizing a search rendered over the 
telephone." Valencia, 93 N.J. at 139, 459 A.2d at 1155. 
 
The defendants do not deny that Judge Calloway lacked 
any authority to issue a telephone warrant because he was 
not a Superior Court Judge, that the judge did not create 
a written document of the oral warrant, and that Sgt. 
Kennedy did not transcribe the judge's oral warrant onto a 
form "designated the duplicate original search warrant." 
Without the creation of such a written record, "the 
subsequent written warrant cannot be reliably compared to 
any prior recordation to determine its fidelity to the 
contents of the original application and oral authorization." 
Valencia, 93 N.J. at 135, 459 A.2d at 1154. 
 
Thus, with respect to the second search of Brigden's 
residence, the district court, albeit granting summary 
judgment for Felsing and Wilson on the ground that they 
did not participate in the search, denied Larkin's and 
Kennedy's motion for summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds and directed that that issue be the 
subject of the jury trial. At the close of the evidence in that 
trial, presided over by the magistrate judge, plaintiffs filed 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of 
qualified immunity, which the magistrate judge denied. He 
charged the jury to decide whether the defendants actually 
believed that the actions they took were lawful, whether the 
defendants were motivated by malice or acted in callous 
disregard or indifference to plaintiffs' rights, and whether 
their mistake was the sort that a reasonably prudent officer 
might make. The jury, answering special interrogatories, 
decided that the warrant was invalid but that Sgt. Larkin, 
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the only defendant as to whom these interrogatories 
applied, had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that 
he was authorized to search Brigden's residence and 
vehicles. 
 
As is evident from our prior discussion of the principles 
of qualified immunity, the first two questions given to the 
jury were either erroneous or irrelevant. However, we need 
not dwell on that error because the third question correctly 
framed the immunity issue. And although it would 
ordinarily have been a question of law for the court, in this 
case there were some historical facts at issue. Specifically, 
it appears to have been in dispute whether Sgt. Kennedy 
appeared before Municipal Court Judge Calloway for a 
telephonic warrant before the second search proceeded, and 
there was even a factual issue as to whether Judge 
Calloway issued a telephonic or oral warrant. Thus, this 
situation is not dissimilar to that in Karnes where we held 
that a factual dispute relating to qualified immunity must 
be sent to the jury, and suggested that, at the same time, 
the jury would decide the issue of objective reasonableness. 
We see no reversible error in the determination that Sgt. 
Larkin was entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
The issue of qualified immunity as to Sgt. Kennedy was 
never resolved by the jury as that issue was foreclosed by 
the jury's response to the interrogatories dealing with the 
role played by each of the remaining defendants in the 
search, and thereafter with causation and damages. The 
first interrogatory as to defendant Sgt. Kennedy asked: "Do 
you find that Officer William Kennedy entered and searched 
the plaintiffs' residence and/or vehicles on the afternoon of 
October 1, 1992?" App. at 1194. The jury was told that if 
it answered "No" to this question, it should not further 
consider liability against Sgt. Kennedy. Plaintiffs objected to 
this interrogatory at trial on the ground that it unduly 
limited the basis on which Sgt. Kennedy could be held 
liable, and raise their objection again on appeal. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that they presented ample evidence at 
trial that Sgt. Kennedy played a crucial role in the unlawful 
search, such as by conveying to the officers at the scene 
that he had obtained a valid search warrant and by failing 
to direct that the search be stopped as soon as he realized 
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that there was no warrant.1 Therefore, they contend that 
the jury should have been allowed to consider whether 
Kennedy should be held responsible for his role in the 
search, regardless of whether he physically entered 
Brigden's residence. 
 
We have plenary review over the propriety of the 
challenged interrogatory as it involves a question of the 
correct legal standard. Mosely v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 94 
(3d Cir. 1996). The limitation of the interrogatory to 
whether Sgt. Kennedy "entered and searched" the residence 
reflects an erroneous view of the law. Sgt. Kennedy may be 
held liable for his role in the illegal search if the jury found 
that he participated by procuring an invalid warrant or 
authorizing the search based on that warrant. See, e.g., 
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 (holding that police officer can be 
held liable for applying for and relying upon a warrant that 
no reasonable officer would rely upon, despite the fact that 
a magistrate judge issued the warrant). Therefore, plaintiffs 
were entitled to have the jury decide Sgt. Kennedy's liability 
based on the totality of his conduct. 
 
Similarly, we have held it was error to grant summary 
judgment for Lt. Wilson as to the second search. It follows 
that he too will be entitled to a determination on his 
qualified immunity claim. Moreover, we note from our 
decision in Rogers that the entitlement to qualified 
immunity may depend upon circumstances individual to 
the role played by each defendant, an issue that the district 
court will have to consider in the first instance. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 1. At trial the plaintiffs presented transcripts of the radio 
transmissions 
which occurred during the course of the search, and Sgt. Kennedy read 
his own statement made during the search to Sgt. Larkin that "I'm 
finishing typing [the warrant] out. I had to retype everything because 
nobody knows what the F. they're doing . . . . [Wilson] got the telephonic 
search warrant . . . now apparently that wasn't done. So we had to do 
the paperwork. I got the affidavit done, the search warrant is in the 
typewriter." App. at 846. 
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IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
to the defendants on the issues of probable cause to arrest 
and the alleged use of excessive force. We reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants 
Sgt. Felsing and Lt. Wilson on the issue of the warrantless 
arrest but affirm the judgment in favor of Sgts. Larkin and 
Kennedy. 
 
With respect to the searches, we reverse the district 
court's holding that the protective sweep was lawful, but 
hold that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on 
that claim. As to the second warrantless search, we affirm 
the grant of summary judgment for Sgt. Felsing, but hold 
that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial as to Lt. Wilson, 
in addition to Sgts. Kennedy and Larkin, and that the 
interrogatory given to the jury regarding Sgt. Kennedy's role 
in the second search was erroneous. 
 
On remand, the jury will have to decide whether Lt. 
Wilson and Sgt. Felsing were justified by exigent 
circumstances for making a warrantless arrest inside 
Brigden's home and, if not, and assuming that relevant 
historical facts remain in dispute, whether they are entitled 
to qualified immunity. The jury will also have to decide 
whether the actions of Lt. Wilson and Sgt. Kennedy 
constituted participation in the second search and, if 
material historical facts remain in dispute, whether they 
are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, if the jury finds 
for plaintiffs on the preceding issues, the jury must then 
determine causation and damages. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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POLLAK, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
Except as to one issue, I find the court's opinion in this 
difficult case masterly: comprehensive, cogent, correct. The 
one issue on which I part company with the court is that 
canvassed in part II.B of the court's opinion. The court 
there sustains the district court's grant of summary 
judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims that the police used 
excessive force in arresting them. Stating that it is 
"reluctant to establish a precedent that would subject every 
police arrest of a group of possible violent offenders to 
compliance with the Marquis of Queensberry Rules of fair 
play," the court, while acknowledging that "these police 
officers came close to the line," concludes that "these 
circumstances, in totality, do not rise to a Fourth 
Amendment violation." With great respect, I disagree. I 
believe that a fact-finder could, on the evidence before the 
district court, reasonably conclude that the police officers 
crossed the line. I think it error for this court to hold that 
arrest methods which the court characterizes as "more akin 
to . . . Rambo-type behavior . . . than the police conduct 
expected in a quiet, family seaside town," merit, as a matter 
of law, a constitutional seal of approval. In my judgment, 
the district court should have permitted the question 
whether excessive force was used to go to the jury. 
 
I will not undertake to set forth at length the factual 
record which underlies my assessment, since the court's 
opinion fairly states the essential facts. I will, however, set 
the general scene and highlight certain details which seem 
particularly relevant to the excessive-force issue. On 
October 1, 1992, the Sea Isle Police Department deployed 
all of its on-duty officers, and brought in reinforcements 
from neighboring towns as well as from its own off-duty 
roster, to arrest four men who were inside a building and 
suspected of an assault involving a pistol. At the time of the 
arrests, various officers stationed outside the building 
carried, aside from their standard sidearms, .30 caliber 
rifles, submachine guns, and shotguns. One member of the 
SWAT team was posted as a sniper. Although no witness 
recounted the exact number of officers on the scene, a 
conservative figure can be assembled from the record of 
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some twenty officers on the scene. This means that at the 
point of arrest, which was effectuated by SWAT team 
members wearing body armor, the police outnumbered the 
suspects by a ratio of at least five to one. When the four 
plaintiffs, pursuant to police directive, emerged from the 
building, they were made to lie down in the dirt and 
menaced with loaded revolvers by officers who, allegedly, 
were threatening to "blow your . . . fucking heads off." 
 
I believe that, at the very least, the plaintiffs have raised 
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether it was 
"objectively reasonable," under the standards the Supreme 
Court articulated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 
(1989), for the officers to use the force they did in arresting 
the plaintiffs. Graham's fact-sensitive inquiry "requires 
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight." Id. In light of the record before the court, a jury 
could reasonably find that the force the officers employed in 
making this arrest was excessive. 
 
The record, viewed, as it must be, most favorably toward 
the plaintiffs, indicates that four suspects--the very 
number the police expected to find--filed out of the building 
as directed by the officers. The police radio transcript cited 
in part II.C.1 of the opinion indicates that the officers were 
apprised, before all the suspects had come out of the 
building, that the gun allegedly involved was not on the 
person of any of the arrestees.2 On this account, plaintiffs 
have certainly raised a triable issue of whether it was 
objectively reasonable under these circumstances to hold a 
loaded weapon to the head of a suspect and employ death 
threats punctuated by obscenity while the apparently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The police radio transcript quotes Mr. Devlin as stating "there's only 
one gun involved, it's a pistol in the brown van in front of the house." 
The Devlin statement tends to undercut the court's statement in part 
II.B that the gun "was still unaccounted for." To the extent that the 
degree of force deployed by the police in making the arrests may be said 
to have depended on alleged uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the 
gun, there would appear to be dispute about a material fact. 
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unarmed and cooperative suspects were held to the ground 
and handcuffed. Considering the formidable array of 
officers and firepower stationed outside, and given that 
plaintiffs apparently did not resist arrest, it would be 
reasonable for a jury to conclude that the force deployed 
was excessive. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants was not appropriate. See Groman v. Township of 
Manaplan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995)(reversing grant 
of summary judgment on excessive-force claim because jury 
could have found police behavior unreasonable). 
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